Social Thought by Purcell, Edward A., Jr.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Other Publications
1983
Social Thought
Edward A. Purcell Jr.
New York Law School, edward.purcell@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Other Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Purcell, Edward A. Jr., "Social Thought" (1983). Other Publications. 402.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs/402
 SOCIAL THOUGHT
 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.
 Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison
 THE SENSE OF INTELLECTUAL FRAGMENTATION AND NATIONAL DECLINE THAT
 characterizes contemporary American social thought contrasts sharply with
 the confidence that permeated Harold Stearns's Civilization in the United
 States. A critical and often carping evaluation of American culture, Stearns's
 book became a classic of the so-called "disillusionment of the intellectuals"
 in the twenties. Yet the "disillusionment" was far shallower and more narrowly
 circumscribed than often claimed, and the book's cultural criticism was
 suffused with optimism. "The common features of industrialism are giving to
 men something of a common experience out of which there will come a
 more or less common-sense appreciation of problems and of ideals," Walton
 Hamilton declared. Exemplifying the attitudes of liberal social thinkers,
 Hamilton believed that such "common experience" would generate shared
 ideals that the physical and social sciences could transform into universal
 progress. "[Elconomic opinion in America," he maintained, "is coming
 slowly to an appreciation of the factors upon which 'the good life for all'
 really rests." It was a heady faith that preached the harmony of democratic
 values and scientific expertise. "The particularized opinion which finds
 expression in the detailed formulation of programmes," he explained, "must
 be left to the experts."' Hamilton voiced the keystone assumptions of Ameri-
 can social thought in the first half of the twentieth century: democratic
 progress through objective knowledge, egalitarian results from elite methods.
 The dominant assumptions underlying the social thought of the past two
 decades differ significantly from those of Hamilton's generation. "Social
 progress" appears ever more illusory, while "political consensus" no longer
 seems the inevitable corollary of scientific knowledge. The social conse-
 quences of scientific advancement are increasingly unpredictable and
 ominous, and the nature of "objective" knowledge itself suddenly appears
 problematic and elusive. Finally, the link between "egalitarian results" and
 'Walton Hamilton, "Economic Thought," in Harold Stearns, ed., Civilization in the United
 States: An Inquiry By Thirty Americans (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922), 270.
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 practical results regardless of theoretical debates, they assumed it would do
 so only in the hands of private corporations and the national military. Insofar
 as science was or would again be advanced by the Left as an instrument of
 social and political change, they could preach its political dangers and
 inadequacies. "So economics today does seem to be at something like an
 impasse," Kristol explained, because the "dominant 'scientistic' model tends
 to drift ever further away from economic reality." In terms of domestic social
 policy, therefore, the only hope was to rely on "that bedrock of truths about
 the human condition that were first comprehensively enunciated in The
 Wealth of Nations. "47
 Finally, theorists of both decades were suspicious of centralization and
 enraptured by images of authentic small-scale communities. Partly a func-
 tion of their outsider stances and their radical goals, the analogous attitudes
 stemmed from parallel perceptions of unresponsiveness in the basic institu-
 tions of contemporary America. Their specific analyses contrasted sharply,
 of course, and even their parallel rhetorical stances served starkly different
 political purposes. Billion-dollar businesses were hardly authentic communi-
 ties, and governmental decentralization in the context of private national
 and multinational corporations was nothing more than a crude power play.
 Nevertheless, fascination with the small-scale community marked in both
 decades with elements of escapist romanticism, revealed a shared reaction
 against the felt demands of the contemporary world. Though the sixties
 dreamed of a transcendent present and the seventies prayed for a deferential
 future, both mirrored in their distinctive ways the traditional American ideal
 of the free individual in the frontier community, an ideal of enduring value
 but forever altered relevance. Both decades failed to create viable reformu-
 lations of the ideal, but they did begin the task of reconsidering the values
 and assumptions that underlay the social thought of the preceding half-
 century and -much as the tumultuous 1880s and 1890s did for the previous
 age -of struggling to create a social theory congruent with the demands of a
 newly emerging and deeply bewildering social reality.
 47lrving Kristol, "Rationalism in Economics," in The Crisis in Economic Theory ed. Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 217, 218.
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